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Abstract: Human cooperation, occurring without reciprocation and between unrelated individuals in
large populations, represents an evolutionary puzzle. One potential explanation is that cooperative
behaviour may be transmitted between individuals via social learning. Using an online social
dilemma experiment, we find evidence that participants’ contributions were more consistent with
payoff-biased transmission than prestige-biased transmission or conformity. We also found some
evidence for lower cooperation (i) when exposed to social information about peer cooperation levels
than without such information, and (ii) in the prisoners’ dilemma game compared to the snowdrift
game. A simulation model established that the observed cooperation was more likely to be caused by
participants’ general propensity to cooperate than by the effect of social learning strategies employed
within the experiment, but that this cooperative propensity could be reduced through selection.
Overall, our results support previous experimental evidence indicating the role of payoff-biased
transmission in explaining cooperative behaviour, but we find that this effect was small and was
overwhelmed by participants’ general propensity for cooperation.
Keywords: cooperation; prisoner’s dilemma; snowdrift; social learning; cultural evolution; payoff;
conformity; prestige
1. Introduction
The spread of behaviour that benefits others is difficult to explain through natural
selection, as such behaviour risks exploitation from others [1]. Scenarios where prosocial
behaviours can be exploited by others are termed social dilemmas [2]. Classic mechanisms
to maintain cooperation include kin selection [3], punishment of non-cooperators [4]
and reciprocity [5]. Given this, human cooperation is especially surprising because it
occurs between unrelated individuals and is often unreciprocated [6,7]. Laboratory studies
(usually from WEIRD samples but see [8]) also show that individuals often cooperate at
higher levels than would be predicted by game theory [9].
Forms of cooperation may be culturally transmitted within or across social groups
through social learning [10,11]. Through social learning, individuals acquire traits or
information by observing or interacting with other individuals or the products of their
behaviour [12]. Social learning allows individuals to obtain adaptive traits that are dif-
ficult to acquire asocially but can also result in the spread of outdated or maladaptive
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information [13,14]. For this reason, complete reliance on social learning is unlikely to be
adaptive [15,16]. Instead, scholars have suggested that selection should favour strategic
use of social learning via strategies that influence when, what and from whom individuals
socially learn [17,18]. Three strategies have received particular attention: payoff biased
transmission (copy traits that yield a high payoff; [16], henceforth payoff bias); conformity
(disproportionate propensity to copy common traits; [19]); and prestige biased transmis-
sion (copy individuals of high status; [20], henceforth prestige bias). Kendal et al. [21]
review evidence for contexts in which these strategies are used, either individually or
in combination.
Given that both cooperation and social learning are thought to underpin the massive
habitat expansion and the evolution of complex cultural systems characteristic of our
species [22,23], it is perhaps surprising that relatively few studies have addressed how
they interact. Conformity may be able to sustain cooperation when combined with punish-
ment [24] or when cooperation is already common [25]. In the lab, participants conformed
to an external group’s donations [26] or cooperated with a previously cooperative part-
ner [27] but direct reciprocity was an overall stronger influence on behaviour. Henrich and
Gil-White [20] suggest that in prestige bias, followers grant voluntary deference towards
leaders in exchange for learning opportunities. This could incentivise copying of coopera-
tion among followers and increased cooperation from leaders [28]. Models suggest that
prestige can maintain cooperation in a larger range of scenarios than other social learning
strategies [28–30]. In the lab, participants have exhibited a bias to copy large contributions
made by leaders [31]. Furthermore, prosocial leaders (measured by a questionnaire) elicited
greater cooperation from their group than selfish leaders and used punishment less than
traditional peer sanctioning groups [32]. Likewise, experimental and ethnographic studies
suggest that leader fairness and charisma can positively affect cooperation [33]. There is
evidence in strictly hierarchical institutions that team performance and information flow is
correlated with the degree of informal prestige conferred upon leaders [34,35] although,
contrary to common marketing strategy, there is also evidence that real-life cooperative be-
haviours are not highly influenced by celebrity endorsement [36,37]. Formal status or rank
has received little attention, although one social dilemma experiment found participants
labelled with stars (indicating a superior quiz performance) were copied more than those
without stars [38].
Because payoff-biased social learning results in the adoption of traits proportional to
their relative fitness, as formalised in the replicator equation [39,40], it would be expected
to spread selfish behaviour. An experimental study showed that participants exhibited a
bias to copy their more successful neighbours and reduce their cooperative contributions
to a public good [41]. Further experimental evidence suggests that participants are more
likely to exhibit a payoff bias than conformity in a cooperation game and reduce their
contributions [42,43] and also decrease their contributions when reminded how their be-
haviour was benefiting others [44]. A recent analysis of 237 PGGs also showed that declines
in contributions were most consistent with improving personal payoffs [45]. Furthermore,
cooperation was also higher when participants had no information on the behaviour of
their group mates [46]. However, payoff biased learning may not be detrimental for co-
operation in all cases, for example when defection is less rewarding [47] or when group
migration and punishment is possible [48]. Generally, it results in the decline of cooperative
behaviour and is the information that is preferentially attended to.
While strategic defection can maximise payoff, the pattern of results points towards
payoff biased social learning being the preferred strategy adopted by participants in social
dilemmas. While conformity can increase cooperation in some contexts, it appears to be the
weakest cue when compared with other social learning strategies [29,42,43]. Prestige (specif-
ically, high status) biased social learning is comparatively understudied in cooperative
dilemmas but is predicted to sustain cooperation in a wide array of circumstances [28,30].
Because no experimental study has considered all three strategies simultaneously in a
cooperative context, this is the primary aim of our study.
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The evolution of cooperation can also be affected by the payoff structure of the social
dilemma. Typically, cooperation games assume a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) payoff structure
(see Table 1), where game theory always predicts defection as the rational choice [49]. An
alternative is the snowdrift game (SD, see Table 1 for payoff structure), also sometimes
referred to as the chicken game or the hawk-dove game [50]. Whereas models based on
the PD predict defection as the evolutionarily stable strategy [51], SD games predict stable
populations of both cooperators and defectors [52,53]. This is because, in the SD game,
exploited cooperators still outperform exploited defectors and so cooperation is favoured
when defection is common. To clarify, the production of enzymes in the environment by
yeast and bacteria equates to a SD game as enzyme producers benefit from their enzyme
production as much as defectors. As predicted, while many cells defect by abstaining from
enzyme production and freeride on neighbouring cells, the production of enzymes is not
extinguished [54,55].
Table 1. Payoffs associated with cooperation (C) and defection (D) depending on the behaviour of a
partner between a PD and SD game adapted from Doebeli and Hauert [50]. Both tables show benefit
(b) compared to the costs (c). Payoff rankings are DC > CC > DD > CD for the PD game and DC > CC
> CD > DD for the SD game.
Prisoner’s Dilemma Snowdrift
C D C D
Payoff to C b − c −c b − c/2 b − c
Payoff to D b 0 b 0
There are fewer experimental studies using the SD game than the PD game, perhaps
because the evolution of cooperation is a harder problem in the latter. Nonetheless, both
scenarios can be seen in the real world. For example, climate issues are commonly seen as a
PD game or dilemmas of collective action [56], whereas scenarios like constructing commu-
nal flood defences or watching for predators are more akin to SD games. One experimental
study comparing an iterated binary PD with a SD game found higher cooperation in the
SD game [57]. Similar patterns have also been found in other experiments, often using
one-shot binary decision games [58–60]. Payoff structure also affects the spatial patterns by
which cooperation is predicted to evolve, where localised clusters and dendritic spines of
cooperators form in models of PD and SD games, respectively [50].
Despite these patterns in findings, comparatively little is known about the dynamics
of the SD game compared with the PD. While there are many examples of PD models which
consider cooperation on a continuum [61], few have considered SD games along these
lines [62–65]. Exact payoff structures vary slightly, but they each follow the characteristic
hierarchy shown in Table 1 and described by Doebeli and Hauert [50]. Typical findings in
such models are a convergence towards contributions of around 50%. No experiments have
considered iterated continuous SD games in a group context or alongside social learning,
so addressing this limitation is the second aim of this study.
Research Questions
Our experiment addresses several key gaps in previous research. Rather than forcing
participants to adopt a particular social learning strategy across experimental conditions,
we adopt a more naturalistic approach by permitting participants free access to the infor-
mation required for all three (prestige, conformity, and payoff bias) of the major social
learning strategies in a cooperative game. We then use statistical models to infer which
social learning strategies were used. We compare both the PD and SD games played across
6 rounds in groups of 4. Each round, participants could contribute between 0 and 10 units
to a pot which was doubled and split between all participants. In the SD game, participants
received no points for the round if the total did not reach 10. This allows a comparison
of cooperation rates and social learning strategy use between games beyond a one-shot
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context and allows participants to express differing degrees of cooperation. To this end,
our experiment employs a between participants 2 (social versus asocial) × 2 (PD versus
SD) factorial design with a PD and SD condition alongside asocial (no access to social
information) and social learning (access to social information) conditions. This experiment
addressed 4 research questions (RQ) (Appendix A).
1. How do social learning strategies influence cooperative behaviour?
1a. Which social learning strategies, if any, do participants use?—We predict
that payoff biased learning will have the strongest influence on cooperative
behaviour [45] followed by prestige and then conformity [38,42,43].
1b. Are the patterns of social learning strategies consistent across the PD and
SD game?—Due to a lack of prior studies, we make no predictions over
the direction of the interaction between social learning strategy use and
payoff structure.
2. What effect does payoff structure have on cooperative behaviour?—We predict higher
cooperation in the SD game than the PD [50,57].
3. What effect does access to social information have on cooperative behaviour? We
predict lower cooperation with access to social information than when individuals make
decisions asocially because we expect a payoff bias to decrease cooperation [45,46].
2. Results
Figure 1 shows the mean cooperation rates from rounds 2–6 for the four experimental
conditions. Generally, mean cooperation was around 6 points at round 2 and showed
little change across subsequent rounds. This suggests that overall cooperation rates were
relatively consistent throughout the experiment. Participants also generally indicated
a good understanding (using a scale of 1/poor to 10/good) of how the game worked
(Median = 8, IQR = 3).
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Although there appears to be little variation between rounds, economic games com-
monly find declines in cooperation across rounds [46,66]. Therefore, it may still be nec-
essary to control for variation between rounds. Two competing models were compared,
one which ignored round (“No round”) and another which added a varying intercept for
round (“Round”). No round had a WAIC score of 5502.3 (SE = 76.9, weight = 0.73) and
Round had a WAIC score of 5504.3 (SE = 77.0, weight = 0.27), indicating no improvement
in out-of-sample predictive ability by varying intercepts by round. The results were similar
when round was included as a continuous linear predictor (No round; WAIC = 5501.4,
SE = 76.9, weight = 0.71, Round; WAIC = 5504.2, SE = 77.0, weight = 0.29). Therefore, all
further models excluded the effect of round.
2.1. Which Social Learning Strategies, If Any, Do Participants Use? (RQ 1a)
Some modelling concerns needed to be addressed before answering this question.
Data from the asocial condition were retained in the model for analysis to ensure that
parameter estimates for the effects of payoff structure can be evaluated across the social
and asocial condition. However, data from the asocial condition cannot be used to estimate
the social learning parameters because participants did not view any social information. To
address this, we modelled the interaction of the three social learning strategy parameters
with the social information condition: the predicted effect is always 0 if the data come from
the asocial condition.
A second concern is that, for participants who are themselves either prestigious (hav-
ing scored highest in a pre-game quiz relating to understanding of how social groups work)
or have the highest payoff, the prestige and payoff social information is not strictly social as
it refers to their own previous behaviour. To address this, the model used binary variables
to exclude each participant from using social learning strategy data about themselves to
construct the social learning parameter estimates. Specifically, prestige interacted with
a binary variable where a value of one indicates they are not the prestigious individual.
Payoff interacts with a binary variable where a value of one indicates they are not currently
the highest earner. Accordingly, parameter estimations occur only for cases where the
slopes are not inflated by one’s own behaviour.
The conformity information presented to participants (average group behaviour)
included their own behaviour, but not exclusively. While reconstructing this variable to
exclude their own behaviour would correct for this issue, this introduces an inconsistency
between the modelled variable and the information participants were presented with in
the experiment. Therefore, the proceeding analysis was repeated for uncorrected (includes
their behaviour) and corrected (excludes each participant’s own behaviour) conformity
information. The main text details the uncorrected analysis while Appendix B shows
the main model predictions with the corrected variable and the difference in estimated
parameters. Qualitatively, the primary conclusions do not differ from one another.
Eight different models were fit to the data, consistent with the constraints described
above, covering all possible combinations of the three social learning parameters (Prestige,
Conformity and Payoff). The compared models ranged from a model containing only the
control variables of experimental condition (SD/PD and Social/Asocial) and being the
prestigious participant, to a model additionally containing all the social learning strategies
(Prestige + Conformity + Payoff). The WAIC values and associated model weights are
displayed in Table 2.
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Table 2. WAIC values and model weights for models evaluating the impact of social learning
strategies. Standard error difference shows the standard error in the difference between each model
and the model with the lowest WAIC value. All social learning parameters interact with the social
information condition. Model names indicate which social learning strategies are included. All
models include the parameters for game structure and social information condition.
Model WAIC Standard Error Difference Weight
Prestige + Payoff 5499.5 0 0.34
Payoff 5499.9 1.3 0.27
Asocial 5501.2 3.3 0.14
Prestige 5501.2 3.0 0.14
Payoff + Conformity 5503.6 1.3 0.04
Prestige + Conformity
+ Payoff 5503.7 0.5 0.04
Prestige + Conformity 5506.6 3.1 0.01
Conformity 5506.7 3.3 0.01
The pattern of WAIC scores do not provide conclusive support for any particular social
learning strategy. Overall, the strongest evidence is for payoff bias as the two top models
which are favoured over the asocial model and have a combined weight of 0.61, include
payoff bias. Conversely, the four models which include conformity have the lowest overall
model weights (0.10), indicating models that include conformity are overfit compared to the
asocial model. There appears to be a small effect associated with a prestige bias, as adding
prestige to a model containing payoff does slightly improve its out-of-sample predictive
ability. However, prestige alone is not favoured over an asocial model, which suggests that
it is primarily payoff that is improving the model fit. Additionally, the asocial model is
(modestly) favoured over those which do not contain a payoff bias or contain a conformity.
This includes the Prestige + Conformity + Payoff model which despite containing payoff,
is penalised by WAIC for including conformity and prestige. This further suggests that
conformity bias and prestige bias are overfit compared with payoff bias.
Parameter estimates (Figure 2) and model predictions (Figure 3) from the Prestige +
Conformity + Payoff model are displayed in the plots below. Figure 3 is split between the
three social learning strategies and predictions are generated for increases in the respective
social learning information while holding all other variables constant. The slope for payoff
is positive which indicates that, generally, participants’ behaviour aligned with the direction
(increase/decrease) of this social information. The slopes for prestige and conformity are
weakly positive but have wider prediction intervals and the parameter estimates overlap 0.
This, combined with the distribution of model weights, suggests that out of the three social
learning strategies, a payoff bias shows the strongest influence on participant cooperation.
Therefore, the changes in cooperation observed are most consistent with a payoff bias.
2.2. Are the Patterns of Social Learning Strategies Consistent across the PD and SD Game? (RQ 1b)
To evaluate any differences in social learning strategy use between PD and SD games
(research question 1b), the Prestige + Payoff + Conformity model was compared to a model
where the social learning parameters also interacted with game structure. This allowed
the model to estimate different slopes for the social learning parameters between the PD
and the SD game. This did not improve model fit (Prestige + Conformity + Payoff: WAIC
= 5503.7; se = 77.3; weight = 0.77, Interaction: WAIC = 5506.2; se = 77.6; weight = 0.23),
indicating that social learning strategy use, or the influence of any social learning strategy,
did not differ between the PD and SD games.




Figure 2. Mean parameter estimates and 95% prediction intervals for all main effects in the Prestige + Conformity + Payoff 
model for the six main effects. 
 
Figure 3. Model predictions for Prestige, Conformity and Payoff varying the three social learning strategies and holding 
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2.2. Are the Patterns of Social Learning Strategies Consistent across the PD and SD Game?  
(RQ 1b) 
To evaluate any differences in social learning strategy use between PD and SD games 
(research question 1b), the Prestige + Payoff + Conformity model was compared to a 
model where the social learning parameters also interacted with game structure. This al-
lowed the model to estimate different slopes for the social learning parameters between 
the PD and the SD game. This did not improve model fit (Prestige + Conformity + Payoff: 
WAIC = 5503.7; se = 77.3; weight = 0.77, Interaction: WAIC = 5506.2; se = 77.6; weight = 
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.3. Evaluating the Experimental Co ditions (RQs 2 and 3)
To evaluate the effects of game structure and the availability of social information on
cooperati e behaviour (r s arch questions 2 a d 3), model comparisons were run betwe n
the Prestige + Conformity + Payoff model and models that droppe different combinati ns
of binary variables pertaini g to g me structure a d social condition or allowed them to
interact. This means these ffects can be evaluated while controlling for social learning
strategy use and remain comparable to the models presented above. Every model also
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retained the control for being the prestigious participant. The WAIC values and associated
model weights are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. WAIC values and model weights for models evaluating the impact of binary experimental
condition variables. Standard error difference shows the standard error in the difference between each
model and the model with the lowest WAIC value. Model names indicate which predictor variables
are included in addition to the social learning strategy parameters. The Prestige + Conformity +
Payoff model is the full model containing the social learning strategies and the parameters for game
structure and social information condition.
Model WAIC Standard Error Difference Weight
Social information





Game structure only 5503.6 1.1 0.16
Prestige + Conformity
+ Payoff 5503.7 0.7 0.15
No binary variables 5505.0 0.9 0.08
The * denotes an interaction in the model.
Overall, there was no clear distinction between any of the models. It is therefore
unclear whether including either (or both) predictors (or their interaction) benefits out-of-
sample model fit or not, though both top models contain the social information condition
(combined weight 0.60).
Figure 4 shows model predictions generated from the interaction model. There is
some indication that cooperation was lower in the social information condition than the
asocial condition and (to a lesser degree) higher in the SD than the PD game (Social = −0.58,
95% PI = −0.04; −1.14, Snowdrift = 0.39, 95% PI = −0.15; 0.94).




Figure 4. 10,000 predicted values of mean cooperation across all experimental conditions generated from the Social con-
dition*Game structure (interaction) model. Sample means and 95% PI are Asocial PD (M = 6.05; 95% PI = 5.23, 6.85), Asocial 
SD (M = 6.44; 95% PI = 5.65, 7.20), Social PD (M = 4.89; 95% PI = 3.96, 5.80, Social SD (M = 5.79; 95% PI = 4.91, 6.64). 
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We used a simulation model to evaluate the longer-term consequences of the patterns 
of behaviour observed in this experiment. This permits the predictions from the Bayesian 
model (and the role of social learning) to be investigated for larger group sizes and under 
selection. This model samples from the Bayesian posterior estimates from the Pres-
tige+Conformity+Payoff model to establish each agent’s intercept propensity for cooper-
ation and the influence of the social learning strategies (taking into account that the sim-
ulation model considers the PD and social condition). Note that the social learning strate-
gies are assumed to operate non-independently of one another. Figure 5 shows that for 
the basic horizontal-transmission simulation, mean cooperation quickly stabilised to a rel-
atively steady state at around a contribution of 5.7, indicating that social learning strategy 
use is not predicted to cause long-term change in the frequency of cooperation in a popu-
lation. By comparison, Figure 6 shows that if we force agents to adopt a particular inter-
cept propensity for cooperation (high, low), cooperation stabilises at different levels. Thus, 
over a long timeframe and provided participants continue to behave on average as they 
did in the experiment, cooperation levels are far more strongly affected by the intercept 
propensity for cooperation than by the effects of social learning strategies. We found that 
group size did not affect these qualitative findings (see Appendix D). 
We introduced selection and small random mutation on the intercept propensity for 
cooperation by assuming intercept values in one round are represented in the next round 
in proportion to payoffs earned and then altered by a small amount by sampling from a 
normal distribution around the inherited intercept value. This simulation can either rep-
resent selection and mutation across biological generations, or modification of an individ-
ual’s propensity for cooperation over time within a generation. 
We found that cooperation declined as agents with small intercepts contribute less 
overall and gain greater payoffs than those with large intercepts (Figure 7). This result 
illustrates that, as expected for a PD game, the stable degree of cooperation shown in the 
horizontal transmission model and observed in the experiment is susceptible to selection 
10, 0 predicted values of mean cooperation across all experimental conditions gen rated from the Social
condition*Game structure (interaction) model. Sample means and 95% PI are Asocial PD (M = 6.05; 95% PI = .23, 6.85),
Asocial SD (M = 6.44; 95% PI = 5.65, 7.20), Social PD (M = 4.89; 95% PI = 3.96, 5.80, Social SD (M = 5.79; 95% PI = 4.91, 6.64).
Games 2021, 12, 89 9 of 26
2.4. Simulation Model Dynamics
We used a simulation model to evaluate the longer-term consequences of the patterns
of behaviour observed in this experiment. This permits the predictions from the Bayesian
model (and the role of social learning) to be investigated for larger group sizes and under
selection. This model samples from the Bayesian posterior estimates from the Prestige +
Conformity + Payoff model to establish each agent’s intercept propensity for cooperation
and the influence of the social learning strategies (taking into account that the simulation
model considers the PD and social condition). Note that the social learning strategies are
assumed to operate non-independently of one another. Figure 5 shows that for the basic
horizontal-transmission simulation, mean cooperation quickly stabilised to a relatively
steady state at around a contribution of 5.7, indicating that social learning strategy use is
not predicted to cause long-term change in the frequency of cooperation in a population.
By comparison, Figure 6 shows that if we force agents to adopt a particular intercept
propensity for cooperation (high, low), cooperation stabilises at different levels. Thus,
over a long timeframe and provided participants continue to behave on average as they
did in the experiment, cooperation levels are far more strongly affected by the intercept
propensity for cooperation than by the effects of social learning strategies. We found that
group size did not affect these qualitative findings (see Appendix D).
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We introduced selection and small random mutation on the intercept propensity
for cooperation by assuming intercept values in one round are represented in the next
round in proportion to payoffs earned and then altered by a small amount by sampling
from a normal distribution around the inherited intercept value. This simulation can
either represent selection and mutation across biological generations, or modification of an
individual’s propensity for cooperation over time within a generation.
We found that cooperation declined as agents with small intercepts contribute less
overall and gain greater payoffs than those with large intercepts (Figure 7). This result
illustrates that, as expected for a PD game, the stable degree of cooperation shown in the
horizontal transmission model and observed in the experiment is susceptible to selection
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resulting in evolution towards extinction. For further detail on the simulation model, see
Appendix D.
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support for prestige or conformity. However, the overall impact of the social learning 
strategies on cooperative behaviour was small. There was little evidence of an interaction 
between game structure and social learning strategy use. Payoff biased copying has also 
been found in previous social dilemma experiments where, in each case, social learning 
and specifically, payoff biased copying eroded cooperation [43,44]. These findings add to 
the growing evidence of payoff biased social learning in a variety of other contexts and 
species [67–71]. 
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cally, conformity may influence patterns of cooperation, but it can often depend on the 
initial composition of the population [25], or other complementary mechanisms such as 
network reciprocity [72]. In social dilemma experiments, conformity can sometimes in-
crease cooperation, though it is outperformed by stronger cues such as reciprocity [26,27], 
is often ignored [43], or increases cheating [73,74]. Outside of cooperative contexts, fre-
quency information is only used if payoff information is unreliable [75], which may ex-
plain our findings. Despite this, a null result in our experiment does not necessarily imply 
conformity is unimportant for the evolution of cooperation. One of the benefits of strong 
conformity, often absent from experimental research [76], is the spread of shared cultural 
norms or values, which in turn, can facilitate cooperation [77]. 
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3. Discussion
This experiment sought to test multiple predictions. Specifically, whether there is
evidence for the use of social learning in social dilemmas and if so, which social learning
strategy between payoff bias, conformity, and prestige bias did participants appear to be
following. Further, comparisons were made between Prisoner’s dilemma and Snowdrift
public goods games. Finally, the statistical estimates of parameters contributing to be-
haviour in the experiment were fed into a simulation model to predict long-term trends,
examining group size and the effects of selection on the propensity for cooperation.
We found evidence for the use of payoff biased learning in social dilemmas, but little
support for prestige or conformity. However, the overall impact of the social learning
strategies on cooperative behaviour was small. There was little evidence of an interaction
between game structure and social learning strategy use. Payoff biased copying has also
been found in previous social dilemma experiments where, in each case, social learning
and specifically, payoff biased copying eroded cooperation [43,44]. These findings add to
the growing evidence of payoff biased social learning in a variety of other contexts and
species [67–71].
In our experiment we found no strong evidence for the use of conformity. Theoret-
ically, conformity may influence patterns of cooperation, but it can often depend on the
initial composition of the population [25], or other complementary mechanisms such as net-
work reciprocity [72]. In social dilemma experiments, conformity can sometimes increase
cooperation, though it is outperformed by stronger cues such as reciprocity [26,27], is often
ignored [43], or increases cheating [73,74]. Outside of cooperative contexts, frequency
information is only used if payoff information is unreliable [75], which may explain our
findings. Despite this, a null result in our experiment does not necessarily imply conformity
is unimportant for the evolution of cooperation. One of the benefits of strong conformity,
often absent from experimental research [76], is the spread of shared cultural norms or
values, which in turn, can facilitate cooperation [77].
The absence of a strong prestige bias was unexpected. Of the little research available,
the effect of prestige or leadership on cooperative behaviour seems overwhelmingly posi-
tive [28,29,31,33,38]. While our study suggests that prestige does not influence cooperation
as strongly as other research has suggested, there are several possible reasons for this. Like
conformity, it may be that prestige was not used because accurate payoff information was
available. By definition, prestige serves as a heuristic to be used when payoff information
is ambiguous or unavailable [78], which has been demonstrated in an experimental set-
ting [79]. It is also important to consider the way prestige was defined in this experiment. A
prestigious individual is defined as someone with either high general skill and knowledge
and/or with a large following [20,80]. Our operationalization of prestige using a quiz
follows other studies that have successfully used this approach [38,79,81]. Nonetheless,
the possibility remains that our participants did not consider the winner of the quiz to
be prestigious in the context of the social dilemma. Moreover, high scoring individuals
demonstrated skill in the same domain as the context in which they could be copied (the
social dilemma game) rather than a potentially less “useful” general knowledge.
It should be noted that, even for payoff bias, the effects sizes associated with social
learning strategies were not particularly large and were all associated with a good deal
of uncertainty. This was reflected in the patterns of model comparison which showed
only small differences in WAIC scores between competing models, which suggests that
each model would make roughly similar out-of-sample predictions. In addition, the
simulation model indicated that social learning strategies did not cause a significant change
in cooperation which, instead, was determined by individual propensities for cooperation
(determined by intercepts). Furthermore, when asked, after their participation in the game,
whether they used the social information in some way, only 28% of participants (that
responded) said yes.
We found lower levels of cooperation in the social information condition than the
asocial condition. Although a concern for reputation might suggest that cooperative acts
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are more common when such behaviour is observable [82,83], overwhelmingly, classic
economic games which provide breakdowns of group mates’ behaviours, find free riding
to be the dominant strategy [2,9]. In a study which compared playing with and without
information about group mates’ behaviour, higher contributions were found in groups
where no information was available [46,84]. These, and our, findings suggest that providing
social information reduces cooperation. One explanation is that social information is used
to update beliefs about how little other group members are contributing [85].
Finally, as predicted, we found evidence of higher levels of cooperation in the SD game
compared with the PD. Although the effect was small, this result is consistent with existing
theoretical work [50,53] as well as biological [54,55] and experimental evidence [57,59]
which predict higher cooperation in SD than PD.
There are several methodological aspects of our study worth addressing. Unlike most
other studies which consider SD games using one shot or binary interactions, we allowed
contributions on a continuous scale across multiple rounds. The setup of our SD game
represented an extremely harsh SD game (e.g., compared to [62,65]) where a failure to
meet the public good threshold resulted in a complete loss of all individuals’ payoffs for
that round. Many formulations (though often binary cases) consider such an outcome
to result in no change in individuals’ payoffs [50]. In that sense, our experiment may be
more akin to a Chicken game, where mutual defection (or failure to swerve) produces
an actively deleterious outcome. Nevertheless, the formulation of our experiment still
conforms to the characteristic payoff hierarchy of the SD game (where cooperating against
defector(s) is preferable to defecting) which applies to real life contexts. For instance, the
failure of a population to reach the investment necessary for functional flood defences
or invest sufficiently in predator defence could result in the collapse of that population.
Therefore, we maintain that the setup of this experiment is a useful approximation of
real-life cooperative dilemmas.
The mean group donation displayed in this experiment was around six units (of a pos-
sible ten), which showed little decline across rounds. This is unusual for PD social dilemma
games, which generally show high initial donations which decline sharply towards the
end of the game [9] and average contributions of around 37% [66]. One possibility is the
relatively low number of rounds in our experiment, though previous experiments have
shown declines within this timeframe [32,43]. Alternatively, participants may have been
confused about how the game worked [86]. While this is possible, our self-report measure
suggested that participants generally believed they understood how the game worked.
A more likely explanation for the elevated contribution rate is the multiplication factor
of 2 used in this experiment. High multiplication factors have been found to both raise
cooperation rates and slow declines across rounds [87,88].
In our experiment, participants could be socially influenced by others taking part
in the same iteration of the social dilemma game. This contrasts with other experimen-
tal designs which only allow social learning between groups playing different iterations
of the social dilemma game [27,43]. The latter approach has benefits, as it allows social
learning to be decoupled from other factors such as reciprocity or the possibility of partici-
pants attempting to influence their group mates’ behaviour through their own behaviour.
Nonetheless, we consider that the within-group social influence design holds greater eco-
logical validity in simulating situations where people may be socially influenced by those
that are participating in the same social dilemma. The decision not to manipulate what
social information was offered to participants also approximated a more realistic scenario,
allowing each participant to adopt one or more social learning strategies [21,42]. Of course,
we cannot discount that participants used some other strategy (or combination of strategies)
aside from the ones considered here [75].
Future research could address individual differences in social learning strategy use
in the context of cooperation [21,68,89]. A larger sample size than was feasible in our
experiment would allow the GLMMs to be extended to include an individual slope for each
participant and calculate the proportion of participants who employed a given strategy [90].
Games 2021, 12, 89 13 of 26
An alternative might be to allow participants to choose what information they viewed [91].
Further attention should also be given to prestige as we failed to document a strong effect
in contrast to clear predictions from theoretical models [28,29]. To address the possibility
that our operationalization of prestige was not relevant to participants in this experiment,
it would be useful to consider a different definition of prestige, perhaps one based on
popularity [79]. Experiments could also investigate other game structures than those
considered here, such as the stag hunt game [92,93]. Finally, it would be useful to consider
social learning strategies within real-world cooperative scenarios. For example, normative
messages are widely used in interventions to reduce household energy use [94] and cultural
group selection has been applied to understand the transmission of lobstering practices in
Maine [95]. Both our study and the literature suggest that payoff bias may affect cooperative
behaviour within applied settings. However, given the overwhelming effect of intercept
variation in our study, it may also be important to consider factors such as personality and
the socio-cultural environment that shapes the development of inclinations to cooperate.
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Design
The experiment involved four conditions in a between participants 2 × 2 factorial
design. Factor one was the social information condition (Asocial vs. Social) which manipu-
lated whether the participants had access to social information (see below). Factor two was
the payoff structure (Prisoner’s dilemma vs. Snowdrift). We used post hoc model selection
to infer which social learning strategies had been used.
4.2. Materials and Procedure
The experiment was executed using the experimental automation platform Dallinger [96]
which recruits participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Upon arrival into the virtual
environment, participants were assigned to a group and a unique numerical participant ID
was generated for them. Once the group contained four participants, the experiment began. It
was split into two parts and all participants completed both parts.
Participants first completed a ten-item quiz containing a variety of questions assessing
their understanding of how social groups work to act as a proxy for prestige (see Supple-
mentary Materials). Each question had three possible answers with one (pre-determined)
correct answer. At the end of the quiz, a public congratulation was displayed on screen
for the participant who gave the most correct answers. For the rest of the experiment, this
participant’s ID was displayed surrounded by stars (*) and participants were aware this
identified the top quiz scoring participant. The questions and scoring were identical across
experimental conditions and at no point were participant’s actual scores revealed.
Following the quiz, all four participants took part in a six-round public goods social
dilemma game (PGG) with either a PD or SD payoff structure, designed in accordance
with typical PGGs found in the literature [97]. Participants did not know ahead of time,
how many rounds they would be playing, but received detailed instructions on how the
game worked (see Supplementary Materials) and that they would receive a bonus payment
depending on their score. In the PD, in each round, participants were granted 10 points
and could then decide how much of this to donate to a pot. The pot was then doubled and
split evenly between all players. The points received from the pot were then added to what
the participant had kept for themselves which formed their total score for that round.
The SD game had the following modification: if the donations to the pot were less
than 10, all participants received nothing for that round (including losing whatever points
they had kept for themselves). This was motivated by precedent as SD models have
previously employed similar payoff structures [53]. Moreover, the snowdrift game requires
that defection offers the best payoff against a cooperator but cooperating is favourable to
defection against another defector [50]. In a real-life environment, this implies the public
good is unreachable without some minimum investment. Therefore, a value of 10 is chosen
as this allowed a single participant to meet the necessary threshold in a single round.
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In the asocial condition, participants received no information about their groupmates’
behaviour and only received feedback on their own earnings from the round (calculated
based on the amount received from the pot and what they kept). In the social information
condition, at the end of each round, participants viewed a table showing each group
member’s ID, their contribution to the pot for that round, their cumulative score and the
average donation across the group. The participant with the most cumulative points was
labelled as the current leader with text beside their ID (see Supplementary Materials). The
participant who scored the highest in the quiz was also labelled with stars (*) around their
name. This information could be used if participants engaged in particular social learning
strategies: the average donation for conformity; the identification of the PGG leader for a
payoff bias; and the identity of the individual who scored the highest in the quiz as a proxy
for prestige.
Once the social dilemma game was completed, participants were debriefed, and
basic demographic information was collected. Participants also answered two short free
text questions to explain their decisions in the experiment (see Supplementary Materials).
Participants were also asked to rate their understanding of the game to ensure they had
understood the protocol [86].
4.3. Participants
Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and completed the
experiment online. After filtering out groups with missing data (exclusion criteria is
described below) this left 286 participants in the dataset. Of those participants, for whom
demographic information was available, the median age was 32.5 years (IQR = 13 years)
with 181 men, 97 women, and 1 non-binary individual. Participants self-identified as White
(195), Black (23), Asian (21), Hispanic (11), other (12), or did not report this information
(21). The experiment took between 5 and 10 min to complete. Participants earned a
minimum of $1 for completing the experiment but could earn a further maximum bonus
of $3 dependent upon their cumulative points score. On average, participants earned
a bonus of $1.62, resulting in them earning above US federal minimum wage. Despite
equal recruitment across conditions, there were unequal completion rates (see Table 4).
The required sample size was determined using simulated data (code available at https:
//osf.io/vx78c/ accessed on: 21 November 2021)
Table 4. Distribution of participants and groups across experimental conditions.
Prisoner’s Dilemma Snowdrift
Asocial Social Asocial Social
20 Groups (N = 73) 17 Groups (N = 61) 24 Groups (N = 84) 20 Groups (N = 68)
4.4. Data Analysis
All analyses were pre-registered on open science (https://osf.io/vx78c/ accessed on:
21 November 2021), though minor deviations to this are explained below. Analyses were
performed in R studio version 4.0.0 [98] using the packages tidyverse, ggplot2, and brms [99].
Though the use of rethinking was pre-registered, brms creates equivalent models and both
packages use MCMC (Markov chain Monte Carlo) to construct the posterior distribution.
Groups were excluded from analysis if either; the group had fewer than three participants
complete the experiment (to avoid 1:1 return from investment and collapse of the social
dilemma [2]) or the individual who scored the highest in the quiz had dropped out. This
also deviated from pre-registration, where any groups of less than four were planned to be
dropped. This was necessary to maintain sufficient power because far more groups than
anticipated were incomplete. The analysis excluded the first round’s donation behaviour,
as participants in the social information condition had not viewed any social information
by this point. Finally, it was pre-registered that only the social condition would be used
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in models evaluating social learning strategies. Adding the interaction with the binary
variable social meant it was not necessary to filter the data in this way.
Cooperation (whole number of points donated between 0 and 10) was treated as a
categorical variable for the purposes of the models, so Bayesian ordered probit regressions
were fit to the data. An ordinal outcome was appropriate for cooperation, as it is not truly
a continuous measure and using a cumulative log odds link function permits non-linearity
between the levels of the variable. Bayesian models were fit using the brms package [99] and
the posterior distribution constructed using MCMC and main model results validated in
JAGS. All models were fit with four chains of 1000 warmup samples and 5500 samples for
inference, using weakly regularising priors. Model diagnostics indicated good parameter
identification and model convergence (Rhat values between 1.00 and 1.01 and lowest bulk
effective sample size > 2500).
Multiple models were fit to evaluate each research question, each containing different
combinations of predictor variables. Though each model differed in terms of additional
predictor variables (described in the respective sections), all models contained a random
effect of participant to account for autocorrelation between repeat observations and vari-
ability between participants. The models used to infer the effect of social learning strategies
on the degree of cooperation also contained binary variable fixed effects of game structure
(snowdrift), social information condition (social) and being prestigious (prestigious partici-
pant, see Appendix C) to act as control variables. For social, the integer 1 indicated it was
the social information condition, for snowdrift the integer 1 indicated it was the snowdrift
condition and prestigious participant the integer 1 indicated they were the prestigious
participant.
The structure of the Prestige + Conformity + Payoff model is shown below, where Co-
operation is predicted by a vector of probabilities p and each response value k is linked to an
intercept parameter ak, with additional deviation from participant level effects (εparticipant)
and slopes for each of the possible predictors (e.g., payoff bias, prestige bias, and confor-




qk, k = 1
qk − qk−1, k > 1
logit(qk) =
{
αk − φ, 1 ≤ k ≤ 10
In f , k = 11
φ = β1 ∗ snowdri f t + β2 ∗ prestigious participant + S ∗ social + εparticipant
S = (β3 + β4 ∗ prestige bias + β5 ∗ payo f f bias + β6 ∗ con f ormity bias)
α1:10 ∼ Normal(0, 1.5)
β1:6 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
ε1:286 ∼ Normal(0, σ)
σ ∼ Exponential(1)
The predictive ability of competing models was evaluated using Widely Applicable
Information Criteria (WAIC) which is computed from the log likelihoods of models and
a parameter penalty to ensure predictive ability is balanced against the risks of overfit-
ting. The calculated value indicates predicted out-of-sample deviance, where lower values
indicate lower deviance (and thus, better fit). Following model evaluation, model predic-
tions were plotted to visualise the results. Note that all model predictions were generated
using the average of the participant effects. For further discussions on this approach,
see [100,101].
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4.5. Simulation Model
We simulated the long-term consequences of participant behaviour, as estimated
by the Bayesian model (see Appendix D for full details of the simulation). In the basic
horizontal-transmission model, agents played repeated PD games. Like the experiment, at
each round agents donated between 0 and 10 units and received a payoff according to their
donation and the total in the public good. Each agent’s contribution for the next round,
was calculated by sampling from the posterior of the Bayesian model that includes all three
social learning strategies. Additionally, each agent had an intercept parameter, which can
be thought of as their baseline propensity towards cooperation, independent of their social
learning strategy use, drawn from the posterior distribution of intercepts estimated from
the experiment.
In addition to matching the simulated conditions to those of the experiment, we
also examined dynamics across different group sizes (see Appendix D) and varied agent
intercept values to establish their influence on dynamics over that of the social learning
strategies estimated from the experiment. We also introduced selection to examine what
happens if, consistent with the replicator equation [40], the distribution of agent intercept
values changes each round (or timestep) in proportion to the payoffs received by the agents.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at https://osf.io/vx78c. Table S1:
Quiz questions and instructions for part 1, Table S2: Participant interface.
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Appendix A. Free Text Responses
During debriefing and collection of demographic information, participants were asked
to provide free text responses (of any length) to two questions. “How do you think most
people would say you should behave in this game?” and, “Why did you choose to behave how
you did in the game?”. Overall, most responses were comments unrelated to the question
such as “good” or were too vague to determine their meaning (for example, “like you
normally would behave”). Where possible, comments were grouped according to themes
in participant’s responses.
Question 1 (Table A1) sought to identify if there was any pattern in social norms
participants felt were associated with the game. Of those that could be grouped, 90
participants either directly suggested cooperative behaviour (or a synonym of this) or
made some reference to “fair” or group beneficial behaviour. Twenty-one suggested
behaviours should be sensitive to the behaviour of others, which indicates concerns for
reciprocity. In this sample, only 11 participants noted selfish behaviour as the expected
norm. A further 14 participants indicated they didn’t know or that they expected variability
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in individuals’ opinions. Nevertheless, the general expected norm for participants in this
experiment was for cooperative behaviour.
Table A1. Summed responses from the question “How do you think most people would say you
should behave in the game” grouped according to the theme of the response.
Theme Count
Unrelated/Unclear comments 148
Behave cooperatively/alluding to “fair play” 90
Reciprocate others cooperation or behave tactically in response to others 21
Unsure/provided no strong indication 14
Behave selfishly or for your own personal benefit 11
Question 2 (Table A2) sought to better understand the conscious decision making
made by participants in this experiment. The two most common themes (40 and 39 partici-
pants respectively) were comments suggesting maximising earnings or that decisions were
based on observing their groupmates. It should be noted that, although 39 participants
reported basing their decisions on their group mates, no participant made explicit mention
of any social learning strategies. Twenty-six participants claimed to be seeking to actively
benefit their group and a further nine did so irrespective of their group’s contributions.
This conforms somewhat with findings from experimental games which find most partici-
pants can be grouped into strong cooperators/free riders, or conditional cooperators [102].
Seventeen participants referenced attempting to behave “fairly” to their group or that it
was the “right thing to do”. Five participants reported following no particular strategy
(reportedly choosing randomly, in some cases), two alluded to the warm glow effect [103]
and feeling good from donating points and one participant reported wanting to “punish”
those withholding points.
Table A2. Summed responses from the question “Why did you choose to behave how you did in the








No particular strategy 5
Overall, there was considerable variation in participants self-reported behavioural
strategies but (aside from being generally influenced by their group) this did not include
any explicit references to the social learning strategies addressed in this experiment. This
ties into debates from the social learning literature regarding the conscious or unconscious
use of social learning strategies [104]. In this case, the patterns associated with social
information in our experiment do not appear to have occurred consciously, though the
frequent mention of maximising earnings may imply the use of a payoff bias. Of note,
participants made no mention of the highest scoring participant in the quiz (the proxy for
prestige), which further supports concerns that this individual was not granted high status
by participants.
Appendix B. Conformity Variable
As described in the main text, the conformity information used in the models included
participant’s own behaviour. Though this is consistent with what participants saw in the
experiment, it means that participants contribute to their own social learning parameter,
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which may inflate the estimate associated with conformity. Therefore, the conformity
information is reconstructed to exclude each participants behaviour from the average
and the Prestige + Conformity + Payoff model was rerun with this corrected variable.
The prestige and payoff bias variables remain the same. Figure A1 shows plotted model
predictions from the new model for varying levels of social information and Figure A2
shows model parameters from the corrected model plotted beside the Prestige + Conformity
+ Payoff model from the main text (uncorrected). The new conformity variable does not
change the pattern of predictions. Payoff bias remains the strongest influence on participant
cooperation while conformity and prestige remain weakly positive. The effect associated
with conformity is virtually unchanged from that of the uncorrected model.
The parameter values are also virtually unchanged. The effect of the social condition
remains negative while the difference between the SD and PD remains weakly positive.
The social learning parameters did not change at all, meaning payoff bias remains as the
most impactful social learning strategy. Therefore, the qualitative interpretations (and,
largely, quantitative results) of the study remain unchanged whichever conformity variable
is used in the analysis.
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Appendix C. Evaluating the Impact of Being Prestigious on Levels of Cooperation
To evaluate the impact of being prestigious on cooperative behaviour, a similar strategy
to that of evaluating social condition and game structure was taken. Note that the goal
was to evaluate whether the subset of prestigious participants was more cooperative than
non-prestigious participants. This is separate from the question addressed in the main
text of whether participants were being influenced by the prestigious individual. The
Prestige + Conformity + Payoff model from the main text was compared to an equivalent
model which dropped the binary variable for prestige and another which also permitted
an interaction with the social condition. This is to assess the possibility that prestigious
individuals may have sought to lead their group by example, as is described in theoretical
work [28]. If this is the case, it would be expected that increased cooperation would only
occur in the social condition (where behaviour is observable). WAIC scores and model
weights are reported below (Table A3).
Table A3. WAIC values and model weights for models evaluating the impact of prestige. Standard error difference shows
the standard error in the difference between each model and the model with the lowest WAIC value. The * denotes an
interaction in the model.
Model WAIC Standard Error Difference Weight
Prestige * Social condition 5503.1 0 0.47
Prestige + Conformity +
Payoff 5503.7 0.3 0.35
No Prestige effect 5505.1 0.6 0.18
The * denotes an interaction in the model.
As in the evaluation between game structure and social condition, there is similarly no
clear distinction between any of the models. The small differences between WAIC indicate
considerable uncertainty as to whether prestige should be in the model or not and that each
model is likely to make very similar predictions. However, the models which include prestige
are slightly favoured over the model that does not, which indicates some improvement in
fit (combined weight = 0.82). To help visualise the predicted effects, model predictions from
the Prestige * Social condition model are plotted below in Figure A3. There is a slightly
Games 2021, 12, 89 20 of 26
greater spread of predicted values for prestigious individuals which is likely explainable by
the smaller number of observations. Otherwise, there is little indication of any difference
between the prestigious and non-prestigious participants and further, no clear indication
of any patterns in the interaction effect. The mean parameter estimate of the fixed effect
for prestige in the interaction model was 0.41 (95% PI = −0.18; 1.00) which overlaps 0
quite considerably, indicating uncertainty in the effect. Overall, there is little evidence that
prestigious individuals are more cooperative than non-prestigious individuals.
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Appendix D. Description of the Simulation Model
We constructed a simulation model which emulated the experiment and used the
Bayesian posterior distributions and the Prestige + Conformity + Payoff model formula to
affect changes in cooperation under various conditions.
At each round, each agent could contribute between 0 and 10 to the public good and
then received a payoff calculated from the sum contributions of others divided by group
size plus how much they kept (as in the experiment). Agents played in groups of varying
sizes (group size is noted for each model below) across 100 rounds. This was repeated for
100 groups. One difference to the experiment was the prestigious agent was assumed to
not partake in the public good. Instead, it was assumed that the prestigious agent could
only be observed by the population, and their contribution level was set to either 2 or 8 (the
value used is specified for each model). This kept the prestige effect consistent between
groups as otherwise the prestigious agent’s behaviour would change alongside the other
agents. The population was finite and did not change size over time. For simplicity, we
simulated only the PD and not the SD payoff structure used in the experiment. Agents





qk, k = 1
qk − qk−1, k > 1
logit(qk) = αk − φ
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φ = S + Intercept
S =
(
βsocial + βprestige ∗ prestigious contribution + βpayo f f ∗ top payo f f contribution
∗not the top earner + βcon f ormity ∗ average contribution
)
At the start of the simulation, each agent samples from the posterior distribution
intercepts (αk) from the Bayesian model. These alongside the cooperation values of other
agents in the current round are used to calculate S. The exception is the level of cooperation
practiced by the prestigious agent, which is always set to 2 (low cooperation) or 8 (high
cooperation).
At each round, we calculate a new cooperation value using the model formula above.
A vector of probabilities for each level of cooperation (p), comprised of the probability of
each individual level of cooperation (k), is used to generate a new value of cooperation
from 0–10. pk is calculated by reversing the logit on the vector of cumulative probabilities
(qk) which is calculated by subtracting the linear model term (φ) from the cut points (αk)
sampled from the posterior distribution. φ is given by the sum of S (social learning effect)
and a varying intercept for each agent which can be thought of as their baseline propensity
to cooperate irrespective of social learning. S is calculated using β values sampled from the
posterior distribution alongside the social information of the current round. Note that to
maintain the degree of parameter uncertainty expressed by the Bayesian model, each agent
sampled unique values for the parameters each round when using horizontal transmission.
Appendix D.1. Order of Events
Agents undergo the following steps. Steps 2–3 are repeated 100 times.
1. Determine starting cooperation—An agent’s starting cooperation is determined by
sampling from the distribution of cooperation observed in round 2 of the experiment.
Additionally, each agent is also assigned an intercept value drawn from the posterior
distribution.
2. Public goods game—Agents play in the public goods game and cooperate according
to their stored level of cooperation. Like the experiment, the public good is multiplied
by 2 and split between all individuals, regardless of contribution. An individual’s
payoff for the round is their earnings from the public good + their leftover contribution
from 10.
3. Modify behaviour—Agents then independently modify their cooperation for the next
round using the model formula shown above. Agents will copy the predicted level of
cooperation exactly.
Appendix D.2. Results
See main text for main results.
Appendix D.3. Varying Cooperative Inclination of the Prestigious Individual
Here we compare dynamics across different constant contributions of the Prestigious
individual, taking a value of 2 or 8. Figure A4 shows that the mean cooperation is weakly
correlated with the degree of cooperation exhibited by the prestigious individual, but does
not change the overall pattern of results.
Appendix D.4. Varying Group Size
Here we compare the effect of group size upon mean levels of cooperation exhibited
across the population. Figure A5 shows that mean cooperation rates stabilise to approxi-
mately the same level, irrespective of group size. Though, on average, smaller groups can
sustain slightly higher cooperation levels than larger groups.
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Appendix D.5. Selection Model 
The Selection Model assumes there is selection acting on intercept values in propor-
tion to payoffs received, alongside mutation where a value drawn from a normal distri-
bution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.1 is added to each intercept. 
In addition to results reported in the main text, here we report a condition where the 
initial distribution of intercept values is varied. A cooperative population was one where 
the population was comprised of intercepts sampled from values in the posterior distri-
bution of above 0. An uncooperative population was one where intercepts were sampled 
from values in the posterior distribution of below 0. Higher intercept values are more in-
clined towards higher cooperation and vice versa. The results of this model across 1500 
rounds is shown below in Figure A6. 
The overall result is unchanged from that of the main text. Both populations trend 
downwards from their initial starting point at similar rates. Cooperative populations sus-
tain greater cooperation levels on average than uncooperative populations on account of 
the different starting intercept distributions. 
i . ti t ti ifi i t l t i i l f i
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Appendix D.5. Selection Model
The Selection Model assumes there is selection acting on intercept values in proportion
to payoffs received, alongside mutation where a value drawn from a normal distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.1 is added to each intercept.
In addition to results reported in the main text, here we report a condition where
the initial distribution of intercept values is varied. A cooperative population was one
where the population was comprised of intercepts sampled from values in the posterior
distribution of above 0. An uncooperative population was one where intercepts were
sampled from values in the posterior distribution of below 0. Higher intercept values are
more inclined towards higher cooperation and vice versa. The results of this model across
1500 rounds is shown below in Figure A6.
The overall result is unchanged from that of the main text. Both populations trend
downwards from their initial starting point at similar rates. Cooperative populations
sustain greater cooperation levels on average than uncooperative populations on account
of the different starting intercept distributions.




Figure A6. Results from the selection model with varying starting compositions for the intercept values in the population 
between uncooperative (intercepts < 0, left) and cooperative (intercepts > 0, right). Black line shows mean cooperation rates 
across all groups and coloured lines show cooperation rates for 8 randomly drawn groups. 
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